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DRUG PRICE REGULATION AND COMPULSORY
LICENSING FOR PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS:
THE NEW ZEALAND CONNECTION
John M. Wechkin
Abstract: This Comment addresses effects of the 1992 rescission of compulsory
licensing laws for pharmaceutical patents in New Zealand. The Comment summarizes
the history behind the change in law, the effect the change has had, projections for future
effects, and the degree to which the change brings New Zealand law into compliance
with proposed General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs ("GAT") provisions. The
effects of the repeal on drug prices appear to be masked by changes in New Zealand's
pharmaceutical price support system. Both changes are illustrative of the continuing
conflict over technology protection in the marketplace, a conflict which is particularly
acute in the area of pharmaceuticals. The change is significant because it may indicate a
shift from intellectual property laws to price regulation as a means by which governments
control the price and availability of pharmaceuticals.

I.

INTRODUCTION

The worldwide development of intellectual property protection has
been characterized by a tension between the desire to provide protections
and incentives for inventors, and the desire to disseminate useful information and inventions. This tension is particularly acute in the pharmaceutical
industry. Drug manufacturers seek to maximize the return on large research
and development investments by means of patent protection for their products. Opponents claim that the monopoly power granted by patents results
in high prices and reduced availability of essential pharmaceutical
products. '

Compulsory licensing is one mechanism by which a government may
curb the monopoly power of a patent. The effect of a compulsory license is
to force the patent holder to license the invention to others in return for a
royalty set by the government. 2 A second mechanism by which to control
I "No other major industry approaches pharmaceuticals in its degree of attachment to patent
protection; in no other field have critics of patent monopolies been so severe." C.T. TAYLOR & Z.A.
SILBERSTON, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 231 (1973).
2 Gianna Julian-Amold, InternationalCompulsory Licensing: The Rationalesand the Reality, 33 J
L. & TECH. 349 (1993) (quoting P. GORECKI, REGULATING THE PRICE OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS IN
COMPULSORY LICENSING, PRODUCT SELECTION, AND GOVERNMENT REIMBURSEMENT
CANADA:
PROGRAMMES (ECONOMIC COUNCIL OF CANADA 1981)).
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the price of pharmaceuticals is the use of direct government price
regulation.
Recently, the trend worldwide has been to restrict the use of compulsory licensing provisions. Two reasons account for this trend: pressure
from pharmaceutical manufacturers and the desire to unify disparate international intellectual property laws under the General Agreement on Trade
and Tariffs ("GATT").3 The long-term effect of this trend may be to shift
the disparities in the treatment of pharmaceuticals from the intellectual
property arena to the price regulation arena. Although there may be no
direct causal link between New Zealand's abandonment of pharmaceutical
compulsory licensing and changes to drug pricing policy, it is clear that in
the absence of compulsory licensing, 4 increased reliance has been placed
upon price regulation as a means for controlling drug prices.
This Comment analyzes the combined effects resulting from New
Zealand's repeal of its pharmaceutical compulsory licensing laws and
modification of its drug pricing regulations. After a general overview of
compulsory licensing, the New Zealand provision and the events leading up
to its repeal are analyzed. The Comment then assesses the effects of the
change in New Zealand, and compliance of the patent law changes with new
GATT provisions. The change in law in New Zealand and the GATT
position on compulsory licensing together have implications for such
provisions in other countries, which are next assessed.
Finally, the
applicability of the changes to the U.S. health care system is analyzed.

II.

COMPULSORY LICENSING

A.

Overview

A patent generally grants the holder the exclusive right to make, use
and sell a useful invention for a limited period of time. 5 The purpose of the
3 Under the current text, member countries are permitted to provide "limited exceptions to
the
exclusive ights conferred by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a
normal exploitation of the patent ...taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties."
General

Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Uruguay Round), Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual
Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, 33 I.L.M. 95, an. 30, (Geneva, Switz.,
Dec. 15,

1993) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. See GATT provisions, infra pan III.C.2.
4 New Zealand repealed its compulsory licensing provisions for pharmaceuticals in 1992. Patent
Act, No. 64, § 51, (1953) (N.Z.) repealed by New Zealand Amendment 1992 No. 81.
5 In New Zealand, the specific language is "make, use, exercise and vend the said invention within
New Zealand." Third Schedule, Patent Regulations, 1954. The patent term in 1992 was sixteen years in
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patent is to "foster human creativity without unduly restricting dissemination of its fruits." 6 Patent protection grants the inventor an opportunity to
exploit potential profits from the invention, thereby recouping investment
costs associated with its creation. 7 The patent protection is designed to
prevent "free riders" from copying the invention without having invested
8
time and money in the prerequisite research and development.
Patent rights are limited to the jurisdiction granting them. 9 Thus, the
holder of a U.S. patent can successfully bring suit for infringement of the
patent only if the infringement occurs within the United States and the
infringer is within the reach of U.S. courts. A foreign infringer beyond the
reach of U.S. courts is not bound by U.S. patent laws. An international
business will naturally seek the greatest protection possible under the laws
of each nation in which it sells patented goods. However, the level of patent
protection available varies greatly from country to country, leaving technology exposed to possible infringement in countries with weak or nonexistent
patent protection. 10
Patent rights may be voluntarily licensed or assigned by the patent
holder. 1'
A compulsory license, however, is an involuntary contract
between an unwilling patent holder and a willing licensee, imposed and
enforced by the state. 12 Compulsory licensing is intended to make the patented product more readily available by permitting licensees, as well as the
patent holder, to produce the patented invention. Such licenses are also
used to reduce the price of the invention. By compelling technology licensing, a government can increase the number of producers in the marketplace,
New Zealand. 1953 Patent Act, No. 64, § 30 (1953) (N.Z.) The patent term has been extended twenty
years to maintain compliance with the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs ("GATT") Trade Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property ("TRIPS") provisions. Patents Amendment Act 1994, No. 122, art. 18.
6

DONALD A. CHISUM & MICHAEL A. JACOBS, UNDERSTANDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 1-2

(19924. See J.H. Reichman, Beyond the Historical
Lines of Demarcation: Competition Law, Intellectual
PropertyRights, and InternationalTrade After the GATT's Uruguay Round, 20 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 81
(1993).

( See
id.

9 For example, under New Zealand law, the patentee has the exclusive right to "make, use, exercise
and vend the said invention within New Zealand." Third Schedule, Patent Regulations, 1954, supra note 5
(emphasis added). Under U.S. law, the patent holder has the right to exclude others from "making, using
or selling the inventions throughout the United States." 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1980) (emphasis added).
10 For a recent listing of countries retaining compulsory licensing provisions, see supra note 2, at
app. A.
II DONALD A. CHISUM & MICHAEL A. JACOBS, UNDERSTANDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW §

2A, at 2-9 (1992).
12 Julian-Arnold, supranote 2, at 349.
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increasing the level of competition between producers, and decreasing the
price of the product.
Compulsory licenses have typically been granted more readily for
pharmaceuticals than for other inventions. 13 Many justifications have been
offered to account for this practice. Compulsory licenses can be used to
stimulate a country's economy by several mechanisms, and are often of
particular interest to developing countries. 14 Such licenses permit local
manufacture of drugs, thus reducing imports. Since the cost of developing
pharmaceuticals may be prohibitive for developing countries, compulsory
licensing provides a means by which to start a high technology pharmaceutical manufacturing industry without investing in research and development
capability. 15 The increased manufacturing capacity attracts doctors, chemists, and other high technology professionals, further stimulating the
economy. 16 Since the drugs are produced by local factories, with local
labor, they can be sold at prices commensurate with the local earning
power. 17
Additionally, the use of compulsory licenses may have political
justifications. Their use permits maintenance of a stable, local source for
pharmaceuticals in the event that an international disturbance makes importation of pharmaceuticals nonviable.18
Compulsory licenses have application in developed economies as
well, when used to curb the dominant market power created by a patent.
Economists argue that excessive patent protection is antithetical to a free
marketplace and that true competition and optimum pricing are realized
only without the artifice of a patent.19 The responsibility on the part of the
State to maintain public health, combined with the desire to minimize the
cost of so doing, make compulsory licensing for pharmaceuticals
particularly attractive.
Finally, compulsory licensing may have technological benefits.
Economists are typically unwilling to accept the claim by pharmaceutical
13 A 1993 survey of intellectual property law indicates that the most prevalent applications of
compulsory licenses occur when a dependent patent is being blocked, when a patent is not being worked,
or when an invention related to food or medicine. Julian-Arnold, supra note 2.
14 Id. at 354.
15 Id.

16 Id.
17 Id.

18 Id.
19 See generally STUDY OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS AND TRADEMARKS OF

THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, S. RES. 236 STUDY NO. 15, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
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manufacturers that the large research and development investments required
by the industry justify maximizing patent protection. 20 Instead, economists
have characterized the efforts of drug manufacturers as generally causing

only incremental changes in drug effectiveness, rather than the large breakthroughs that might justify large capital expenditures. 2 1 In fact, the
presence of patent protection may provide an incentive to develop drugs

which simply escape patent infringement, rather than drugs which are truly
22
innovative.
On the other hand, compulsory licensing measures have been criticized on several grounds. 23 Foreign firms may be dissuaded from supplying
their wares to markets governed by patent laws containing liberal compul-

sory licensing provisions. Such provisions clearly weaken the patent
protection available to the manufacturers. As a result, manufacturers have
less incentive to develop drugs tailored for countries with weak patent
protection. Developing countries in particular, which may have unique
pharmaceutical requirements, will not attract significant research and
24
development activity if they also have weak patent laws.
Pharmaceuticals, compared with other products, are particularly easy
to copy because "reverse engineering" methods can be used to determine
25
It
the constituent components of the drug and its method of manufacture.
is therefore argued that stronger rather than weaker patent protection should
26
be extended to pharmaceuticals.
The cost of developing drugs is often extremely high, 27 due not only
to the expenses associated with developing and testing the drug, and
20 An early study on the subject determined the percentage of the product selling price due to
research and development costs for a variety of products: pharmaceuticals (11.5%), ranked high in
comparison to plastics (2%), mechanical products (3%), and telecommunications products (5.5%). But
pharmaceuticals ranked lower than electronics (13.5%). TAYLOR & SILBERSTON, supra note 1,at 145.
This would indicate that pharmaceuticals should be treated as any other product, and compulsory licenses
should not be easier nor more difficult to obtain for pharmaceuticals than for other products.
21 Telephone interview with Dr. Reinhard Pauls, Manager of Research and Analysis at
Pharmaceutical Management Agency Ltd. (Pharmac) (Nov. 28, 1994) [hereinafter Pauls Interview].
22 Id
23 See generally RICHARD T. RAPP & RICHARD P. ROZEK, NATIONAL ECONOMIC RESEARCH
ASSOCIATES INC. ("NERA"), BENEFITS AND COSTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (June 1990); Richard P. Rozek, The Consequences of PharmaceuticalProduct
Patenting: A Critique, 16 WORLD COMPETITION (March 1993), at 91.
24 RAPP & ROZEK, supra note 23, at 32.
25 Id.at 7. See also Thomas G. Field Jr., Pharmaceuticalsand Intellectual Property: Meeting Needs
Throu hout the World, J' L. & TECH. 3, 9 (1983).
6 APP & ROZEK, supra note 23, at 91.
27 The cost has been estimated at U.S.$231 million in 1987 dollars. Rozek, supra note, 23 at 99
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obtaining government approval and bringing the drug to market, but also
due to the development costs associated with drugs that ultimately prove
unmarketable. 28 A manufacturer with a patented product has a limited time
(the duration of the patent)29 to charge prices reflective of the research and
development investment which resulted in the patent. A compulsory license
cuts short this period of time. With a compulsory license in hand, a generic
manufacturer has access to the patented technology without having spent
resources on research and development, 30 and is therefore able to charge a
lower price than that charged by the brand-name manufacturer. The brandname manufacturer may respond by lowering its price below that which
properly accounts for its research and development expenditure. To recoup
that expenditure, the brand-name manufacturer may increase prices in
markets which have fewer generic manufacturers, particularly those markets
which do not permit compulsory licensing. 3 1
The company obtaining a compulsory license has a double advantage.
As discussed above, the selling price of the licensee's drug does not need to
reflect research and development costs. In addition, the profit margin on the
licensee's drugs is reduced. Since the risk associated with investment in
ventures which merely manufacture pharmaceuticals is less than that associated with ventures which actually perform research and development,
those investing in manufacturing ventures expect a lower return on their
investment. 32 A lower return on investment implies a lower profit margin
which in turn means that the licensee can charge lower prices in the
marketplace.
A final argument for abandoning compulsory licensing is that the
widespread repeal of such measures will bring international uniformity to
the field of patent law and should therefore improve the overall efficiency
of the patent system. 33 As patent laws around the world are made more uniform, the risk associated with the uncertainties of international transactions
28 One study has indicated that of 4,000 drugs which started development, only five actually made it

to market. Alan M. Fisch, Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceutical Patents: An Unreasonable Solution
to an Unfortunate Problem, 34 JURIMETRICS, Spring 1994, at 303.
29 Patent terms vary from country to country. The current GATT agreement calls for 20-year patent
terms. Trips Agreement, supra note 3, art. 33 at 96. New Zealand has recently adopted the 20-year term.
Patent Act, No. 64, § 30, (1953) (N.Z.), as amended by New Zealand Amendment 1994, No. 122. The
United States has adopted the 20-year term as well. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103465, t 532, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) (amending 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988)).
30 TAYLOR & SILBERSTON, supra note I, at 249.
31 Field, supra note 25, at 4.
32 TAYLOR & SILBERSTON, supra note I. at 249.
33 Field, supra note 25, at 22, n.86 (1983).
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is reduced. Lower risk on the part of the seller should imply lower prices,
as well as increased distribution.
Prior to 1992, New Zealand patent laws contained provisions specifically intended to permit minimally restricted compulsory licensing for
pharmaceutical patents. Major pharmaceutical manufacturers, backed by
the United States, strongly oppose compulsory licensing. 34 By means of
threatened trade sanctions, the United States exerted pressure on New
Zealand, and as a direct result, New Zealand repealed its liberal compulsory
35
licensing provisions for pharmaceuticals.
B.

Compulsory Licensing of PharmaceuticalPatents in New Zealand

In 1953, New Zealand passed the Patent Act, 36 which contained
provisions explicitly permitting compulsory licensing of pharmaceuticals
and food products. 37 Section 51 of the Act required the Patents Commissioner, upon application by any interested party, to compel a pharmaceutical
patent owner to grant the applicant a license to use the patent on terms
specified by the Commissioner. 38 The Commissioner was to ensure that
such products were made available to the public at the lowest possible price,
consistent with the patentees' deriving a "reasonable" profit from their patent rights. 39 Thus, foreign manufacturers seeking patent protection for their
products sold in New Zealand were subject to the .possibility of a
compulsory license.
Until 1992, cases brought under section 51 rarely resulted in the grant
of a compulsory license. 40 This does not necessarily imply that section 51
had no effect. Rather, the limited use of section 51 may simply have been

34 See generally RAPP & ROZEK, supra note 23, at 9 1.

35 See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
36 Patent Act, No. 64 (1953) (N.Z.).
37 Patent Act, No. 64, § 51, (1953) (N.Z.). The compulsory license measure was based upon similar
English legislation, which was put into effect after World War I in reaction to perceived dominance by the
German pharmaceutical manufacturers. New Zealand: How USA's Heavy Hand Forced Drug Reihink,
NAT'L Bus. REv., June 19, 1992, at 26 availablein WESTLAW, INT-NEWS database [hereinafter NBR].

38 Section 51 applies to food, medicine, or surgical or curative device patents.
Patent Act, § 51
(195319 Patent Act, No.
64, § 51, (1953) (N.Z.).
40 Prior to 1992, only three compulsory licenses were actually granted under section 51, and none of
these were ever put to practical use because the patent holder was able to control the price of active
ingredients. An additional application submitted in 1991 was withdrawn. NBR, supra note 37, at 26.
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an indication of its dormant power to urge successful negotiations between
4
potential licensees and licensors. 1
In 1990, the dormant power was revived. Pacific Pharmaceuticals, a
generic drug manufacturer, applied to the Patent Commissioner for a compulsory license from Glaxo, one of the world's largest brand-name drug
companies. 42 In a brief statement, the Commissioner noted that the application presented a primafacie case for a compulsory license under section
51, and granted the license. 43 Glaxo appealed the decision, which was upheld by the Court of Appeal Wellington. 44 The court held that Glaxo was
unable to overcome a presumption in favor of the grant of a license and that
the Patent Commissioner was therefore justified in granting the license on
the basis of anticipated increased competition. 45 The presumption in favor
of the grant was an indication of the ease with which a prima facie case
could be made out. The court expressly noted that "New Zealand may be
moving into an era in which applications for compulsory licenses for drug
'
patents become more common. "46
The court's prediction was not in fact realized. The grant of a compulsory license to Pacific Pharmaceuticals exacerbated a legislative erosion
of patent protection for pharmaceuticals in New Zealand. 47 Despite generally strong patent protection for other products,4 8 amendments to the New
Zealand Medicines Act in 1989 compromised the rights of pharmaceutical
patent holders 49 by permitting parallel trade of pharmaceuticals. 50 Although
the Medicines Act was watered down in 1990, the United States was not
41 See Julian-Arnold, supra note 10 at 364.
42 Glaxo Group Ltd. v. Commissioner of Patents, 3 N.Z.L.R. 179, 180 (C.A. 1991).
43 Id.
44 The court held that by showing that it could produce Ranitidine (an anti-ulcerant) at prices equal
to or below those charged by Glaxo, Pacific pharmaceuticals had made out a prima facie case for a
compulsory license. Id.at 184. Since no apparent "good reason" for refusing the application was supplied,
the Commissioner's decision was permitted to stand. Id.
45 Id.at 183.
46 Id.at 184.
47 NBR, supra note 37, at 26.
48 The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development ("UNCTAD") rated New Zealand
patent laws a "four" on a scale of zero to five, with five representing protection fully consistent with U.S.
Chamber of Commerce minimum standards. RAPP & ROZEK, supra note 23, at A-3
49 USTR Releases Annual Trade Report on Restrictions Around the World, PAT. TRADEMARK &
COPYRIGHT DAILY (BNA) May 22, 1991, available in LEXIS, PATENT Library, BNAPTD File
50 Parallel trade occurs when a foreign manufacturer arranges with an exclusive distributor for the
importation of a patented product into a target country, and a third party buys the product in the country of
manufacture and imports it without authorization. Kaoru Takamatsu, ParallelImportation of Trademarked
Goods: A ComparativeAnalysis, 57 WASH. L. REv. 433 (1982).
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entirely mollified. 51 As a result of the general treatment of pharmaceutical
patents, and specifically the presence of section 51, New Zealand was put
on the U.S. Trade Representative's "watch list" in 1990.52 The watch list
represents the first step taken by the U.S. Trade Representative toward
imposing trade sanctions under "Special 301 ''53 of the 1988 Trade Act.
In response to the mounting pressure, the New Zealand legislature
repealed section 51 of the Patent Act in August 1992, 54 thereby deleting the
provision specifically aimed at compulsory licensing for pharmaceuticals.
55
New Zealand was removed from the watch list in October 1992.
Several factors contributed to the repeal of section 51. Perhaps most
obviously, the provision was anachronistic, based as it was on post-World
War I British legislation which had outlived its original purpose. 56 In addition, compulsory licensing is often perceived as particularly beneficial to
developing countries, since developing economies may have the greatest
difficulty supporting the high cost of drug development. 57 New Zealand,
however, is considered a developed capitalist country, 58 with a gross

51 USTR Releases Annual Trade Report on Restrictions Around the World, PAT. TRADEMARK &
COPYRIGHT DAILY (BNA) May 22, 1991, available in.LEXIS, PATENT Library, BNAPTD File.
52 NBR, supra note 37, at 26.
53 Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, Jan. 3, 1975, 88 Stat. 1978, as amended by 19 U.S.C. §§
2101-2495 (1988). The 1988 Trade Act permits the U.S. Trade Representative to designate countries with
inadequate protection for intellectual property. 19 U.S.C. § 2242(a)(l)(A), as amended by Pub. L. 103-82,
107 Stat. 2156, Dec. 8 1993; Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4938. Dec. 8, 1994. Such countries are

designated "priority foreign countries." 19 U.S.C. § 2242(a)(2) as amended by Pub. L. No. 103-82, 107
Stat. 2156, Dec. 8 1993; Pub. L. No. 103465, 108 Stat. 4938. Dec. 8, 1994.

Designation as a priority

foreign country represents the last step before trade sanctions may be imposed, provided the inadequacies
cannot be resolved via negotiations or dispute settlement. 19 U.S.C. § 2415(a)(1) (1988). Official notice
in the Federal Register is provided for priority foreign country listings, indicating the reasons for the
designation. 19 U.S.C. § 241 l(d)(3)(C)(ii) as amended by Pub. L. No. 103465, 108 Stat. 4938. Dec. 8,

1994. The U.S. Trade Representative may identify countries with less inadequate protection for
intellectual property by placing such countries on a "watch list" or "priority watch list." Telephone
interview with Joseph Papovich, Deputy Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Intellectual Property
(November 16, 1994). No official notice is given for countries with watch list or priority watch list
designations, nor does the U.S. Trade Representative's office keep any public records on file for watch list
countries. id.
54 Patent Act, No. 64, § 51 (1953) (N.Z.), as amended by New Zealand Amendment 1992, No. 81.
55 New Zealand Removed From Intellectual Property.List, INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA) Oct. 13,

1992, available in WESTLAW, BNA-BTD database.
56 The initial purpose of the English legislation which New Zealand adopted was to prevent adverse
effects on the English pharmaceutical industry due to perceived dominance by German pharmaceutical
manufacturers. NBR, supra note 37, at 26.
57 See discussion supra part II.A.
58 CHARLES S. RHYNE ET AL., LAW-MAKING AcTIVITIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON
TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT 119 (1976).
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national product commensurate with that of Western European nations. 59 In
1992, Canada was the only other industrialized nation with broad-based
compulsory licensing laws, and was on the verge of repealing those provisions. 60 Thus, section 51 may not have been appropriate for New Zealand as
a developed nation.
On the other hand, proponents of compulsory licensing argue that
benefits exist even for a developed country such as New Zealand. The New
Zealand Public Health Association ("PHA") cited the lack of competition
created by patent protection as a factor leading to increased prices.
Although the U.S. drug manufacturers typically respond to such charges by
pointing to the flourishing generic market in the United States, 6 1 the PHA
indicated that New Zealand's small market makes it difficult to obtain good
prices from large manufacturers and noted that brand-name manufacturers
are buying up generic manufacturers in order to retain control over prices
once the patent expires. 62 Finally, while section 51 was not used
extensively, it presented the silent threat of a compulsory license, and as the
Glaxo court noted, that threat was likely to become more potent after Pacific
Pharmaceuticals' victory was upheld. 63
External forces with significant domestic effects in New Zealand
ultimately appeared to force repeal of section 51. New Zealand wished to
expand its agricultural exports, 64 particularly to the United States, but was
in no position to do so as a result of the watch list designation by the U.S.
Trade Representative. Glaxo put additional pressure on the legislature by
threatening to withdraw plans for a multi-million dollar pharmaceutical
plant. 65 These external pressures were considered to outweigh the potential
benefits associated with retention of section 51.
59 New Zealand's 1985 per capita GNP of U.S. $7,290 ranks between that of Italy (U.S. $6,500) and
the United Kingdom (U.S. $8,380). RAPP & ROZEK, supra note 23, at A-Il.
60 NBR, supra note 37, at 26. Canada has since amended its patent laws. Canada Approves Changes
to Drug Patent Legislation, REUTERS CAN. FtN. REP., Feb. 4, 1993, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library,
CURNEWS File. The change included a repeal of pharmaceutical compulsory licensing measures.
American Pressure Killed Compulsory Licensing Not NAFTA. CDMA Asserts, Canada Newswire, June 2,
1993, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, CURNEWS File.
61 RAPP & ROZEK, supra note 23, at 98. In the absence of compulsory licensing measures, generic
manufacturers obtain access to patent rights either by obtaining voluntary licenses from patent holders or
by delaying manufacture until after the patent term has expired.
6NBR, supra note 37, at 26.
63 Glaxo Group Ltd. v. Commissioner of Patents, 3 N.Z.L.R. 179, 184 (C.A. 1991).
64 Mark Magnier, New Zealand Skirts Nuclear Debate to Get U.S. Support on Farm Trade, J. COM.,
July 1 1991, at IA, availablein WESTLAW, IOC database.
65 New Zealand: Legal Victory Proves Pyrrhicfor Generic Drug Maker, NAT'L Bus. REV., June 26,
1992, at 6, availablein WESTLAW, INT-NEWS database.

Nov. 1995

C.

THE NEW ZEALAND CONNECTION

PharmaceuticalPriceRegulation in New Zealand

Shortly after the repeal of section 51, New Zealand's health care system underwent significant changes. Prior to 1993, the New Zealand
government provided price subsidies for prescription drugs on the basis of
chemical composition. 66 Under that program, doctors generally were not
informed of drug prices and pharmacists did not have the power to substi67
tute one drug for another.
Under the current regulations, doctors are informed of drug prices,
and Regional Health Authorities ("RHAs"), which provide the drug
subsidies, are given an annual budget.6 8 Thus, an incentive now exists to
prescribe the lowest priced drugs, and the information required to make the
proper decision is in the hands of the prescriber. Furthermore, the regulating authority, Pharmaceutical Management Agency Ltd. ("Pharmac"), has
adopted a reference pricing scheme. 69 Under this system, drugs are classified into therapeutic groups, consisting of drugs which are used to treat the
same or similar conditions. Therapeutic groups are further divided into
subgroups, consisting of drugs which produce similar therapeutic effects
while treating similar conditions. 70 The subsidy price is established by the
lowest priced drug within a subgroup. 7 1 If a manufacturer charges more
72
than the subsidy price, the purchaser must pay the difference.
The changes in the drug price regulation scheme were clear attempts
to improve the efficiency of the health care system. 73 By making information available to those in decision-making positions, the use of less
expensive treatments is encouraged. By establishing a subsidy price equal
to the lowest priced drug within a therapeutic subgroup, manufacturers are
encouraged to charge low prices but need not give up patent protection.
The combined effects of these changes and the repeal of section 51 are
analyzed in the following section.

66 Pauls Interview, supra note 21.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 PHARMACEUTICAL MANAGEMENT

AGENCY, LTD., OPERATING POLICIES AND PROCEDURES OF

PHARMACEUTICAL MANAGEMENT AGENCY LIMITED, July 1993 at 8 [hereinafter OPERATING POLICIES].

70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Pauls Interview, supra note 21.
73 Id.
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THE EFFECTS OF THE RESCISSION OF SECTION 51

Since the repeal of section 51 and the changes in drug price regulations, the following results have occurred. Drug prices in New Zealand
have been stable and the number of generic manufacturers has increased, 74
indicating that price regulations have been effective despite the loss of
compulsory licensing. Compulsory licensing measures not specific to
pharmaceuticals have been amended, 75 making frequent use of such provisions unlikely for any product, including pharmaceuticals. The reforms of
these measures bring them into compliance with recent GATT provisions. 76
The combination of the new GATT provisions and U.S. policy on compulsory licensing, suggests that continued pressure will be brought to bear on
countries retaining liberal compulsory licensing measures. Finally, the
worldwide shift from compulsory licensing to price regulation may eventually force the United States to adopt such regulations, in which case the
New Zealand approach provides a reasonable template on which to base
new legislation. Therefore, understanding the effects of price regulation in
New Zealand is important for U.S. pharmaceutical manufacturers and
regulatory bodies.
A.

Effects on the New Zealand Marketplace

The countervailing effect of pharmaceutical pricing reforms appears
to be responsible for the fact that, despite the repeal of section 5 1, drug
prices in New Zealand have remained stable, 77 and the number of generic
manufacturers in the marketplace has actually increased. 78 The indirect
method of obtaining price controls by curbing intellectual property rights
has been effectively replaced by increased direct regulation of prices. The
question presented then is whether on balance increased reliance on price
regulation, and in particular the type of reference pricing adopted by New
Zealand, represents an improvement over reliance on compulsory licensing.

74 Id.

75 Patents Amendment Act No. 64, § 46(2) (1953) (N.Z.). See infra notes 91-93 and accompanying
text.
76 The recent GATT provisions are contained in the TRIPS Agreement. supra note 3. For further
discussion, see infra part III.C.2.
77 Pauls Interview, supranote 21.
78 Id.
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There is a clear benefit to drug manufacturers as a result of the
reduced threat presented by compulsory licensing. 79 Manufacturers are free
to enter and exit the market without fear of losing patent protection. As a
direct result of increased patent protection, plans for a New Zealand manufacturing facility, which were shelved by Glaxo during the debates over the
repeal of section 51, have since been approved.80
The effects of reference pricing are a bit less clear. Reference pricing
in general has been criticized on several grounds. First, by charging the
purchaser for any difference between the established subsidy price and the
price desired by the manufacturer, manufacturers are forced to match the
subsidy price because purchasers will not choose to pay anything if they
have the option to pay nothing.8 1 While the strategy may result in shortterm price reductions, the long-term effects are less certain.8 2 Long-term
effects may include an eventual reduction in research and development
83
efforts due to reduced revenues from drug sales.
A second criticism is that price regulation schemes focus narrowly on
drug prices and not on overall expenditures.84 This criticism appears to be
met by New Zealand's implementation method. Under the New Zealand
system, the RHAs operate a budget which includes pharmaceuticals as part
of a larger health care package. Thus,, if a more expensive drug treatment
saves money in the long run by reducing the need for fnore costly procedures, the RHAs have the ability to make the long-term cost-effective
85
choice.
The reference pricing system provides some of the same consumer
benefits that compulsory licensing would. It provides incentives for
manufacturers to produce drugs within a therapeutic subgroup at the lowest
possible cost. This will tend to encourage generic manufacturers to enter
the market. The system also provides incentives for manufacturers to
79 The threat has not been completely eliminated. Compulsory license measures do still exist in New
Zealand in only a general sense.

These measures are not applied specifically to pharmaceuticals.

The

general provision makes the grant of a compulsory license more restrictive than section 51. See discussion
in Section I11.
80 1992 NATIONAL TRADE DATA BANK MARKET REPORTS, Nov. 13, 1992, available in LEXIS,
ASIAPC Library, NZEAL File.
81 HEINZ REDWOOD, PRICE REGULATION AND PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH-THE LIMITS OF
COEXISTANCE 40 (1993).

82 Long-term results for countries with reference pricing systems have been described as
"disaplointing." Id. at 41.

83 This possible effect is discussed in greater detail infra part 111.D.
84 REDWOOD, supra note 81, at 59.
85 Pauls Interview, supra note 21.
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develop truly innovative drugs because such drugs may be placed in a
separate subgroup, and thus remain immune from direct price competition
until similar drugs are independently developed.8 6
The trouble is that treating New Zealand as a closed system may tend
to exaggerate the potential benefits of price regulation. With price regulations in place, New Zealand consumers can benefit from the research and
development efforts of brand-name manufacturers while paying the lower
prices charged by generic manufacturers. Brand-name manufacturers must
recoup their investment in unregulated markets, where they can charge
prices representitive of their research and development expenditures. The
United States is an obvious example of such a market. Thus, while cost
savings can result in the short term and perhaps even in the long term in
New Zealand, the reason may simply be that the true cost of research and
development is being borne by consumers in unregulated markets, such as
87
the United States.
In sum, intellectual property rights have been strengthened by the
repeal of section 51, and drug prices in the short term have remained Stable.
More time is required to assess the long-term effects on drug prices and, just
as importantly, time is required to determine the effect of increased price
regulation on research and development.
B.

Alternative Compulsory Licensing Measures

The repeal of section 51 did not expunge compulsory licensing measures from the New Zealand Statutes. Section 51 dealt with compulsory
licensing for foods, medicines, and surgical devices, 8 8 but a manufacturer
seeking a compulsory license might instead apply under sections 46-50 of
the Patent Act. These sections permit compulsory licensing of any patentable invention, although under more severe restrictions than were required
under section 51. Under section 51, a compulsory license could be granted
upon application by any interested person, with no additional restrictions
beyond the Commissioner's approval.8 9 Under sections 46-50, compulsory

86 OPERATING POLICIES, supra note 69.
87 Industry Issue Brief-International Price Comparisons, PHARMACEUTICAL

MANUFACTURERS OF AMERICA, 1994, at 7.6 [hereinafter PHRMA].
88 Patent Act No. 64, § 51 (1953) (N.Z.).
89 Id.

RESEARCH &
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licenses can be granted only under particular conditions, such as inadequate
working. 90

However, even the general compulsory licensing measures were
recently made more restrictive in order to comply with GATT intellectual
property measures.

On January 1, 1995, New Zealand passed additional

reforms of the Patent Act, among them modifications to section 46. The
changes limit compulsory licenses for domestic markets, 9 1 eliminate the

availability of compulsory licenses for junior patents, 92 and require that
licensing negotiations be attempted with the patent holder prior to the grant
of a compulsory license. 93 These changes bring the New Zealand compul-

sory licensing measures into compliance with GATT provisions.
The section 46 applicant has a difficult task ahead. Successful use of
section 46 prior to 1992 was nonexistent, 94 and with additional restrictions

imposed as of 1995, it is possible that compulsory licensing in New Zealand
has truly been limited. 95 Particularly in the area of pharmaceuticals, the
90 Under the Patent Act No. 64 (1953) (N.Z.), a compulsory license will be granted if the patent is
not being worked to the fullest extent capable in New Zealand (§ 46(2)(a)), if importation of the patented
article hinders commercial working of the patent in New Zealand (§ 46(2)(c)), if by refusal of the patentee
to grant a license, an export market is not being supplied (§ 46(2Xd)), or if the working of another patent
(junior patent) is hindered by the patentee's refusal to grant a license (§ 46(2)(d)). Non-working of a
patent occurs when the patent owner does not exploit the patent. Compulsory licensing is one solution to
the problem, since it permits others to produce the patented article. PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT,
PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE DOcTRINES 497 (1993). Non-working is of particular concern
where public health or safety is at issue.
9
"The grounds upon which a license may be granted under this section are that a market for the
patented invention is not being supplied, or is not being supplied on reasonable terms, in New Zealand."
Patents Amendment Act No. 64, § 46(2) (1953) (N.Z.), as amended by New Zealand Amendment 1994,
No. 122.
92 The Patent Act originally permitted compulsory licenses in cases, where by the refusal of the
patentee to grant a license, the working or efficient working of any other patented invention was hindered.
Patent Act No. 64, § 46(2)(d)(ii) (1953) (N.Z.). This language was deleted in the 1994 Amendments.
Patents Amendment Act 1994, § 46 (N.Z.).
93 "No license shall be granted under this section unless the person applying for the license, having
taken all reasonable steps to do so, has been unable to obtain a license, or to obtain a license on reasonable
terms, from the patentee." Patents Amendment Act 1994, § 46(7) (N.Z.).
94 It should be noted that as of 1992, no licenses have been granted under the current provisions.
New ZealandJoins PCT; Compulsory License Provisionsare Abolished, PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT
DAILY, (BNA) (Nov. 6, 1992), available in LEXIS, PATENT Library, BNAPTD File. This may be an
indication that no compulsory licenses were sought or, perhaps more likely, that the threat of compulsory
licenses provided the incentive for successful negotiations. If the latter is the case, then mandating
attempted negotiations prior to the grant of a compulsory license should not have a significant effect on
current business practices.
95 On the other hand, it is not clear exactly why the use of § 46 has been limited. It is possible that
the threat of a compulsory license forced successful negotiations. See supra note 41. It is also possible that
pharmaceutical applications which would have gone through section 51 will now simply be redirected
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continued threat of trade sanctions by the United States may well discourage the Commissioner from granting compulsory licenses under section 46.
The changes in New Zealand's compulsory licensing laws were
brought about through the use of two separate means. Section 51 was
repealed as a result of bilateral negotiations with, and unilateral trade sanction threats by, the United States. The modifications to section 46 were
brought about as a result of New Zealand's status as a signatory to the
multilateral GATT agreement. The GATT position on compulsory licensing is important, both for its effect on New Zealand law and its effect on the
laws of all member nations. The GATT position is reflective of both the
trend away from compulsory licensing and the reluctance of member
nations to abandon compulsory licensing as quickly as the United States
might wish.
C.

Compliance with GA TT

The General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs ("GATT") is a multilateral trading agreement which has focused on the elimination of non-tariff
trade barriers among member nations. 96 The most recent round of GATT
negotiations, the Uruguay round, included considerable treatment of intellectual property issues collectively known as Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property, or TRIPS. Compulsory licensing received special
consideration in the GATT TRIPS,97 and the evolution of the current
agreement is indicative of both the disparity between developed and developing countries and the continued unease associated with patent rights for
pharmaceuticals. The pressure brought to bear on New Zealand in-a bilateral setting was present in a multilateral setting throughout the GATT treaty
negotiations.
1.

Pre-UruguayRound IntellectualPropertyAgreements

Prior to the formulation of the TRIPS language during the Uruguay
round of GATT, the Paris Convention and Patent Cooperation Treaty

through section 46. However, it is indisputable that obtaining such a license under section 46 will be more
difficult, due to the requirement for domestic use and proof of attempted negotiations.
96 RALPH H. FOLSOM ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 19 (1991).
97 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 3, at 95 (discussing "limited exceptions to the exclusive rights"
granted by a patent).
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98
provided the bases for international protection of intellectual property.
Under article 5 of the Convention, compulsory licenses could be granted
99
against the patentee for "abuses" of rights under the patent. Compulsory
licenses could also be granted for failure to work or insufficient working of
the patent.'00 These provisions have been interpreted as permitting compulsory licenses to be used liberally when local working of the patent is
considered insufficient.101

2.

GA TT Compulsory Licensing Provisions

In 1988, the European, Japanese, and United States business
communities proposed GATT provisions prohibiting the discrimination
against particular classes of subject matter when granting compulsory
licenses.102 The language was specifically directed at countries which
maintained provisions permitting easy compulsory licensing for food and
medicine. 103 The current GATT text does not contain the suggested
prohibition on discrimination. This is an indication of the international
resistance to U.S. efforts to curb the use of compulsory licensing.
Under the current text, member countries are permitted to provide
"limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent, provided
that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent . . . taking account of the legitimate interests of third
parties." 104 The exception is subject to two restrictions. First, the individual must have made efforts to obtain authorization from the rights holder on
98 Under the Paris Convention, foreign holders of local patents are to be treated no differently than
local holders. FOLSOM ET AL., supra note 96, at 615, citing Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property of March 20, 1883. as revised at Brussels on December 14, 1900, as revised at
Washington on June 2, 1941, as revised at The Hague on Nov. 6, 1925, as revised at London on June 2,
1934, as revised at Lisbon on October 31, 1958, as revised at Stockholm on July 14, 1967, art. 2, 21 U.S.T.
1631 [hereinafter Paris Convention.] The Patent Cooperation Treaty provides for uniform patent search
and filing procedures. Id. at 615, citing Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, entered into force
January 24, 1978, 28 U.S.T. 7645. However, neither treaty provides for international uniformity of patent
protection.
99 Paris Convention, supra note 98, art. 5, § 2, 21 U.S.T. 1636.
100 Under the Convention, compulsory licenses could be granted for failure to work or insufficient
working four years after the date of filing or three years after the date of patent grant, whichever occurred
later. Paris Convention, supra note 98, art. 5, § 4, 21 U.S.T. 1637.
101 Reichman, supra note 7, at 101.
102 II IIC STUDIES, GATT OR WIPO? NEW WAYS IN THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 372 (Friedrich-Karl Beier & Gerhard Schricher eds., 1989).
103 1d at 374.
104 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 3, art. 30, at 95. "Third parties" include consumers, other
manufacturers, and governments.
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reasonable commercial terms. 105 Second, use of the patent is predominantly
for the supply of the domestic market of the member country authorizing
such use. 106 The requirement for authorization efforts will be waived in the
event of a national emergency, 107 and both requirements will be waived if
the use of the patent is a remedy for anti-competitive practices.10s
Remuneration shall be paid to the patent holder to account for the economic
value of the authorization.109 Any doubt that this language leaves the door
open to compulsory licensing of pharmaceuticals is dispelled by comparing
similar TRIPS language in article 21 dealing with the compulsory licensing
of trademarks, which states flatly that "compulsory licensing of trademarks
shall not be permitted." 11 0
The net effect of the GATT provisions is that compulsory licenses
cannot generally be granted unless prior negotiations have failed to yield a
satisfactory solution. Beyond this requirement, considerable flexibility is
given to national governments to develop their own methods for promoting
internal development.I1 The revised text does not prevent special treatment for food and pharmaceuticals, as did the 1988 text. In fact article 8,
which contains basic principles of the TRIPS provisions, allows member
nations to revise national laws as necessary to protect public health and
nutrition. 12
Nevertheless, the new GATT measures represent a restriction on
compulsory licensing when compared to the Paris Convention provisions.
It also seems likely that within the GATT framework, the trend toward
reducing the use of compulsory licensing measures will be amplified in bilateral negotiations between countries which maintain liberal compulsory
licensing measures and those which seek to have such measures
105 Id. art. 31(b), at 95.
106 Id art. 3 1(0, at 95.
107 Id. art. 31(b), at 95.

108 Id. art. 31(k), at 96.
109
110
...
112

Id art. 31(h), at 95.
Id. art. 21, at 90.
Reichman, supra note 7, at 104.
Article 8.1 states that "Members may, in formulating or amending their national laws and
regulations, adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public
interest in sectors of vital interest to their socio-economic and technological development, provided that
such measures are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement." TRIPS Agreement, supra note 3, art.
8.1, at 87. Article 8.2 provides: "Appropriate measures, provided that they are consistent with the
provisions of this Agreement, may be needed to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by right
holders or the resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international
transfer of technology .... " TRIPS Agreement, supra note 3, art. 8.2, at 87.
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removed. 13 Technically, New Zealand was not required by GATT to repeal
section 51. However, the gradually decreasing tolerance of compulsory
licensing by the GATT members makes bilateral and unilateral actions by
the United States, such as those engaged in with New Zealand, more consistent with GATT mainstream policies. The GATT position, while reflective

of the controversy surrounding compulsory licensing, is indicative of the
trend away from such laws as a means to control pharmaceutical prices.
D.

Effects Beyond New Zealand's Borders

1.

Implicationsfor Compulsory Licensing Worldwide

The change in patent law in New Zealand has implications for the
United States and its trading partners. U.S. Trade Representative Carla

Hills cited New Zealand's action as one which ought to be followed by
other countries.1 14 At the time the legislation was passed, thirty-four countries were on the "Special 301" list. 115 The fact that a significant effort was
expended by the United States and drug manufacturers to reform a relatively

small market116 may be another indication that the reforms were intended as
much to set an example as to protect holders of New Zealand patents. The
United States was no doubt concerned that if a developed nation such as
New Zealand were unwilling to repeal compulsory licensing provisions,

developing countries, which risk a greater potential for loss by rescinding
compulsory licensing measures, would be even less likely to enact such
reforms. 117
Canada presents an example of another nation which came under
attack by the United States for maintaining liberal pharmaceutical compul- 113 It should be noted that the passage of GATT has not affected the use of Special 301. under
which the United States can impose trade sanctions (as it threatened to do in the case of New Zealand's
section 51) against countries seen as maintaining lax intellectual property standards. For a brief
description of Special 301, see supra note 53.
114 Following the repeal, U.S. Trade Representative Carla Hills was reportedly "pleased that the
issue was resolved" and stated that she hoped "other trading partners will follow the lead of New Zealand
by modernizing their patent laws consistent with evolving international trends." New Zealand Removed
From Intellectual Property List, INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA) (Oct. 13, 1992).
115 US Cites India, Taiwan, Thailand for Worst Records on Intellectual Property, PAT.,
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT DAILY (BNA) (May 1, 1992), available in WESTLAW BNA-BTD database.
The list is updated annually and in 1994, 27 countries were represented. It remains to be seen whether
subsequent lists will include countries which have adopted the GATT TRIPS provisions.
116 The population of New Zealand was 3.5 million in 1991. Magnier, supra note 64.
117 For a recent listing of countries retaining compulsory licensing provisions, see Julian-Arnold,
supra note 2.
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sory licensing laws. The Canadian experience is important for two reasons.
First, Canada, like New Zealand, was under direct pressure from the United
States to modify its compulsory licensing measures.118 Such pressure was
at least partially responsible for the eventual repeal of Canadian compulsory

licensing measures for pharmaceuticals.1 19 The Canadian experience thus
provides an additional example of U.S. zeal to go beyond GATT in securing
strong patent protection for pharmaceuticals, and bring the laws of its trading partners into compliance with those of the United States. 120 Second, the

Canadian law repealing compulsory licensing provisions included measures
strengthening drug price controls.121 This action is another indication of the

shift toward direct price control brought about by the repeal of compulsory
licensing measures.
The long-term effects of changes in both Canada and New Zealand

should be closely followed to determine whether the shift in price control
mechanisms results in a net increase in benefits to patent holders and
consumers over the long term.
2.

Implicationsfor US. PharmaceuticalPriceRegulation

As other countries turn to price regulation and drug prices are forced
below their market values, the result may be that international pharmaceutical companies charge higher prices in the United States to make up for the
118 In February 1993, Canada passed Bill C-91, which reformed drug patent laws. Canada
Approves Change to Drug PatentLegislation.REUTERS CAN. FIN. REP., Feb. 3, 1993, available in LEXIS,
NEWS Library, CURNWS File.
The reform included the repeal of compulsory licensing for
pharmaceuticals. American Pressure Killed Compulsory Licensing, Not NAFTA, CDMA Asserts, CAN.
NEWSWIRE LTD., June 2, 1993, availablein LEXIS, NEWS Library, CURNWS File. The Canadian Drug
Manufacturers Association ("CDMA") asserted that the measure was not repealed in order to comply with
either GATT or NAFTA. Id. Indeed, NAFTA art. 1709(6) contains language nearly identical to that in
GATT art. 31, which, as discussed in part III.C., does not prohibit compulsory licensing.
119 American Pressure Killed Compulsory Licensing, Not NAFTA, CDMA Asserts, CAN.
NEWSWIRE LTD., June 2, 1993, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, CURNWS File.
120 The United States maintains extremely limited compulsory licensing measures in the areas of
environmental technology, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1875(h)(6); and nuclear energy, e.g. Atomic
Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2183(g). CHISUM & JACOBS, supra note 6, at 2-309, n. 19 (1992).
121 According to the Pharmaceutical Manufacturer's Association, Canada ("PMAC") the legislation
grants the Patented Medicine Prices Review Board ("PMPRB") increased powers to order price rollbacks
and reimbursement of excess revenues from patented pharmaceuticals. Debate Rages in ParliamentOver
Drug-Patent Legislation PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT DAILY (BNA) (Jan. 6, 1993), available in
LEXIS, BNA Library, BNAPTD File. Included in the measure is language permitting the provincial
governments to consider reference pricing as a means to control drug costs. Year of "Unprecedented
Turmoil" in Canada, MARKETLETTER (PUBLICATIONS) LTD., June 20, 1994, available in LEXIS, NEWS
Library, CURNWS File.
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shortfall. The net effect may be similar to that under a liberal compulsory
licensing regime, namely that U.S. consumers provide a disproportionate
amount of the support required to develop new pharmaceuticals. U.S.
consumers may end up subsidizing consumers in countries with strong price
regulations, just as they previously subsidized consumers in countries with
weak patent protection.
The United States need not give up its own strong patent laws to
establish equity with other members of the international marketplace. One
option the United States has is to attempt to reduce the use of drug price
regulations worldwide. This approach has been advocated by major drug
manufacturers. 122 However, such an approach is bound to be fraught with
difficulties. Foreign nations are by nature reluctant to change purely
internal policies, particularly those concerned with public health, at the
behest of the United States. In addition, the sheer number of developed as
well as developing countries which maintain some form of drug price
control system 123 provides worldwide resistance to changes in regulatory
schemes.
A second option is for the United States to implement a price regulation scheme of its own in order to place U.S. consumers on an equal footing
with international consumers. Such measures have been considered as part
of the recent health care proposals now before Congress. 124 As might be
expected, price regulation schemes have not been met with approval from
drug manufacturers. Manufacturers point out that countries which have
pricing freedom for pharmaceutical products are correlated with countries
which generate significant contributions to pharmaceutical research and
development. 125 However, correlations do not necessarily imply causation.
Drug manufacturers also point out that price regulation systems tend to be
more concerned with low drug prices than with low expenditures. They
contend that lower prices may result in excessive consumption and an ultimate rise in per capita pharmaceutical expenditures. 126 In this regard, the
New Zealand system appears to balance the maintenance of a competitive
drug industry with the desire to keep prices low. 127 If the benefits brought
122 PHRMA, supra note 87.
123 REDWOOD, supra note 81, at 39.
124 One such plan to enforce price regulation for new breakthrough drugs was defeated in 1994.
Dingell Will Kill Drug Review Council Plan, MARKETLETrER, May 2, 1994, available in LEXIS, NEWS
Library, CURNWS File.
125 REDWOOD, supra note 81, at 3.
126 Id. at 59.
127 See OPERATING POLICIES, supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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about by the New Zealand system are long-lived, such a system can provide
a template for institution of drug price control in the United States.
An additional difficulty with price regulation in the United States is
that research and development may be further discouraged, since drug
manufacturers will have no other markets available in which to charge
prices reflective of their research and development expenditures. One
solution to this difficulty is to increase the research and development
subsidies already made available to the industry through the National
Institutes of Health ("NIH").128

Ironically then, each increase in government participation in the
marketplace leads to the need for additional participation. Patent protection
resulted in the need for price regulation, which in turn may result in the
need for increased research and development subsidies. The inevitable
conclusion is that, particularly in the area of pharmaceuticals, where public
health and safety are at issue, some form of government participation is
necessary. As the United States and the world become increasingly
committed to strong patent protection, governments will naturally tend to
seek supplementary schemes such as price regulation and research subsidies
by which to balance low prices and availability with incentives for
continued development.
IV.

CONCLUSIONS

The effect of the repeal of New Zealand s pharmaceutical compulsory
licensing laws was to exceed the requirements currently mandated by
GATT. Remaining compulsory licensing measures have been modified to
be compliant with GATT. Any tendency for prices to increase as a result of
the repeal of New Zealand's compulsory licensing provisions were overshadowed by updates to New Zealand's price regulation plan for
pharmaceuticals. This indicates that as compulsory licensing is restricted,
price regulation may play a greater role in establishing pharmaceutical price
levels.
If past trends are any indication, the United States will continue to
advocate the reduced use of compulsory licensing for pharmaceuticals
worldwide, despite the fact that GATT, which restricts compulsory licensing, does not prohibit such measures. By so doing, U.S. and foreign
128 Statement Callsfor Attention to Medical Research in Reform Debate,HEALTH CARE POL'Y REP.
(BNA) (May 9, 1994), available in LEXIS, BNA Library, BNAHCP File.
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inventors can obtain patent rights abroad which at least approach those
granted by a U.S. patent. This is a positive step, in that it increases patent
uniformity and allows patent holders to enter foreign markets without the
threat of compulsory licensing. However, as the use of compulsory licensing is diminished, price regulation will increasingly be relied upon as a
means for ensuring low drug prices. The likely result is that U.S.
consumers, operating in a relatively unregulated market, may subsidize
consumers elsewhere.
By adopting a price regulation system of its own, the United States
may both ensure lower drug prices and put U.S. consumers on an even
footing with those in the rest of the world. The New Zealand system may
serve as a useful model-one that balances price regulation with price
competition and research incentives.

